Yo Gents,
This brings us to the Berdan II. Aside from the rifle equipped with the bayonet lug and tenon for the sword bayonets trials of 1876, the remainder of my Berdan II rifles are regular issue patterns.
The rarest of these would be my Model 1870 Cavalry Carbine, which is in excellent condition and completely matching. The carbines, based at least on my own observations are the rarest of the Berdan IIs. Over the years, I have encountered more of the Berdan I, Berdan II B'ham production, Cossack Rifles and Dragoons than I have Cavalry Carbines? How this compares to other peoples experience, I can't say?
I will add one qualifier to that statement in that I exclude the bizarre combination examples coming out of Afghanistan as of late since it is near impossible to tell what is or isn't original to any given example! All combination of features have been showing up that do not match any of the recognizable Russian military patterns, many with hand made replacement parts!
I have included a few photos below of a B'ham Berdan that I was offered many years ago, however the stock had been broken and badly repaired and the asking price was in the second mortgage range, so I passed! However I did save the photos. Based on the lack of a final number representing the year of mfg in the cartouche, I believe that this rifle was submitted for trials somewhere else other than Russia? The presence of Belgian Liege markings, in my opinion, substantiates this opinion.
In addition to these rifles, I also have a nice completely matching 1874 dated Berdan II from the first year of production, I believe at Ishevsk? I'm pretty sure it's an Ishevsk? I'll check when I get home!
I also have an Austro-Hungarian capture/reissue example that has been equipped with wire sling swivels.
To date, both the Dragoon and Cossack rifles have eluded me, not that I haven't come across several examples of each. They were either waaaaay too expensive relative to what I could afford at the time OR they had something about them that I didn't like! I came across a Dragoon rifle that was very nice, but it had a very old leather action cover screwed into the side of the stock? All of the recent examples have come out of the Middle East and were either messed with or not in original configuration.
Here are the photos and another excerpt from the manuscript. Perhaps I'll finish some day? Who knows? As noted below, both Colt and BSA suffered severely financially due to their involvement in the development of the Berdan I and II! Only Smith & Wesson managed to deal with the Russians during this time period and actual profit from the experience!
Warmest regards,
JPS
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The Development of the Berdan II Rifle
As Colt struggled to get out the 30,000 Berdan I rifles ordered by Russia in the initial contract, Berdan was busy in England working with Birmingham Small Arms Company. With his role in the development of the Berdan I completed, Hiram Berdan was busy looking for other markets for his existing designs as well as new technologies, which he might successfully apply to his existing firearms. As production got under way at Colt under the expert guidance of Colonel Gorlov, Berdan began experimenting with different systems, including the sliding bolt action. In his search for new markets, Berdan had obviously come become acquainted with the newly adopted French Chassepot. More than likely, he was already familiar with the Prussian Dreyse needle rifle. He had also come in contact with BSA. They were a large commercial operation who produced weapons for both domestic as well as foreign contracts. It was during his contact with BSA that Berdan either developed or “borrowed” the concept for his next evolutionary rifle design. For reasons that were soon to become apparent, Hiram Berdan moved his developmental work from the Colt Factory in the U.S. to the BSA Factory in England.
It is very likely that while traveling abroad looking for new customers, Berdan had become acquainted with either the Prussian Dreyse needle-rifle or the French Chassepot. Whichever the case, Berdan renewed his bolt-action experiments at the BSA facilities. Berdan’s center fire brass cartridge resolved the major problem suffered by both of these needle fire designs. Both the Dreyse and the Chassepot were plagued with gas leakage. Both relied on a hard rubber obturating ring on the bolt head to seal the chamber and to prevent the potentially dangerous escape of gas from the chamber past the bolt head. The rubber rings quickly became embrittled during rapid fire. As the rubber ring deteriorated, the risk to the soldier firing the rifle became greater with each shot. The other major fault of the needle fire system was the erosion of the needle, which passed through the powder charge to strike the primer located on the base of the bullet. The combustion of the gunpowder engulfed the firing needle during every shot. Needle failure became a serious problem as needles were exposed to constant heating as well as the ill effects of black-powder. The use of the sliding bolt system with the metallic cartridge immediately solved the worst problems inherent in existing bolt-action designs.
It was not long before the first prototype bolt-action rifle appeared. The rifle was for all-intense and purposes, a Berdan I with a sliding bolt to close the action rather than a swinging breechblock. The caliber was the same as were all of the other external dimensions. This was not an accident. Nor were the timing and sequence of Berdan’s travels. He was planning and executing the proverbial end run! The self-aggrandizing inventor had come to realize that he had already made as much money as he was ever going to see from the Colt contract, particularly in light of Colt’s discovery of the real intentions of the Russians. The patent rights had all been assigned and all of the royalties paid. He would continue to be paid royalties on the 7.5 million metallic cartridges being produced by UMC, but as far as the rifle went, the show was over even though it had hardly begun.
When a sufficient number of rifles had been delivered, the Russian Armament Commission had requested that General Berdan travel to Russia to both demonstrate the workings of the new Berdan-Gorlov rifle (the initial name applied to the Berdan I design by the Russians), as well as to train a core group of Russian officers in the use of the weapon. It was intended that these training officers would in turn, train the Russian corps of NCO’s and develop a new manual to be issued with the rifle.
Prior to Berdan’s trip to St. Petersburg, he had concluded a contract with BSA for the production of 100 test rifles. Berdan paid for these rifles out of his own pocket. In addition to the hand made trials rifles, Berdan also reached an agreement with BSA, which allowed them to market the new bolt-action rifle design on his behalf. In exchange for the marketing agreement, BSA guaranteed Berdan royalties for each rifle produced by BSA for any contracts they managed to secure for his new design. With this agreement concluded, BSA hired Leone Gluckman to work as a European sales representative to promote the new Berdan rifle. Gluckman traveled to several different European countries seeking orders for the prototype rifle. After several unsuccessful attempts to sell the design in Western Europe, he traveled to St. Petersburg, Russia in late 1868. The proposal Gluckman placed before the Armaments Commission included an interesting clause. If Russia ordered 300,000 production rifles from BSA, at the conclusion of the contract, BSA would sell the entire production line, complete with all machinery, tooling and gauges, to the Russian Government. The offer indicates that BSA must have been aware, to some degree, of the Russians intentions to eventually build rifles in their own arsenals. It is not known what response this offer received from the Russians. No follow up correspondence exists regarding the Russian response.
While Leone Gluckman had been busy traveling across Europe seeking customers for Berdan’s new rifle, Hiram Berdan had spent several months in Paris trying to sell his new model to the French Army. After exhaustive testing, the French came to the conclusion that the Berdan prototype, while superior, was not effective enough to warrant the cost of replacing the Mle 1866 Chassepot. The Chassepot had only been adopted two years earlier and was in full-scale production. The cost of changing models at that point in time was simply too great to allow them to switch rifles before the Chassepot had been issued throughout the French Army.
Having failed to procure an order from the French in 1868, in 1869, Berdan finally traveled to St. Petersburg per the Russian’s request. The first deliveries of Berdan I rifles had already arrived in Russia. Berdan was expected to train key Russian personnel in the function of the Berdan I Infantry rifle as well as to author a manual for translation into Russian. What was not expected, however, was that he would arrive with a new prototype rifle. He quickly arranged a demonstration of the Berdan II bolt-action prototype for the Armaments Commission. Everyone was extremely impressed. The Berdan II answered what the commission felt were the apparent shortcomings of the Berdan-Gorlov rifle, i.e. the Berdan I.
The greatest technical problem apparent in the Berdan I was weak extraction. Under ideal circumstances, the extractor worked. Still, the hinged breechblock of the Berdan I suffered the same problem as nearly every other hinged breechblock design of this period. The lifting of the breechblock simply did not impart great mechanical leverage. After sustained firing, the cartridge cases periodically jammed in the chamber. The short time that the extractor was in contact with the case rim during the pivoting action of the breechblock was not sufficient to back the case out after substantial amounts of black powder residue had built up in the chamber. Under these circumstances, the extractor would on occasion pull past the case rim, bending the contact point in the process and leaving the case in the chamber. To avoid this, the Berdan I required periodic cleaning during extended firing, a feat, which was not particularly popular with the troops who were issued the rifle. Still, it was a remarkable improvement over the weapons it replaced, all of which suffered from substantially worse problems without having the advantages or the ballistics of the Berdan I. This would never have been considered the drawback it was thought to be had not a better system come along. But a better system did come along. The sliding bolt design had much greater leverage in removing the cases from the chamber and the extractor remained engaged on the cartridge case rim throughout the entire extraction sequence. While the extraction problems with the Berdan I were never to plague the rifle under actual combat conditions, the other major consideration, which favored the Berdan II design, had nothing to do with the function of the rifle and could not be overcome. Through out this entire period of rearmament following the Crimean War, the two greatest factors considered by the Russians in the adoption of every small arms system considered, were the ease of operation of the rifle and more importantly, the ease of manufacturing the weapons system.
The Czar had rightfully come to the conclusion that the future of Russian armament would eventually have to depend of the Russians ability to produce their own weapons. Russia lacked the facilities to achieve this goal. They understood only too well that they would require the simplest successful system available. Other wise, an already daunting task might very well be made impossible. To undertake a complex design, while attempting to modernize and expand the Russian arsenal system, would increase the risk of failure exponentially. In addition to the manufacturing considerations, the Russian Army also realized the limitations of their peasant soldiers. The mass formations fielded by the army in time of war were hardly a sophisticated lot. The simpler the system, the better it suited the Russian soldier. For all of the very same reasons, maintenance was also of prime consideration. In these categories more than any other, it was very clear that the Berdan II rifle fit these criteria better than the Berdan I.
Surprisingly, of lesser consequence in reaching this decision, was the greater rate of fire achievable with the Berdan II. Since the bolt cocked on closing, it omitted the additional step of cocking the hammer of the Berdan I. In addition, when loading the Berdan II, the cartridge can be dropped into the feed-way and chambered by the forward motion of the bolt. The design of the Berdan I requires that the cartridge be pushed all the way forward into the chamber manually. Both of these operating requirements greatly reduce the rate of fire of the Berdan I. The result was a tested rate of fire of ___ rounds per minute for the Berdan II as opposed to ___ with the Berdan I. In the age of the breech loading single shot, the Berdan II had a decided advantage over its competition.
Following successful trials, the Russian Armaments Commission adopted the Berdan II and immediately began negotiating with Hiram Berdan and BSA for the production of 30,000 rifles. The negotiations were already under way when Gorlov, Gunius and Colt learned of the Berdan II prototypes produced at BSA and tested by the Armaments Commission. Gorlov was furious, as was Colt. They felt that they had been betrayed and they were right. Gorlov railed against the adoption of the Berdan II declaring the Berdan I superior in every respect. While he had every right to be angry, it was at this point where he allowed professional jealousy to stand in the way of good judgment. The Berdan II was superior to the Berdan I, particularly in respect to the most important considerations for the future of Russian arms production. He had little influential support for his views among the members of the Russian Armaments Commission. When Russian production of the Berdan I (aka Berdan-Gorlov) rifle was eventually halted in favor of concentrating all efforts on the Berdan II, Gorlov’s bitterness over the entire affair resulted in a last gasp effort to halt the adoption of the Berdan II. He appeared before a meeting of the Armaments Commission and recommended the adoption of the British Martini-Henry in leau of the Berdan II. This was an unfortunate turn of events. Colonel Gorlov’s excellent work on behalf of the Russian Army was overshadowed by his rabid attempts to sabotage the acceptance of the Berdan II.
With Colonel Gorlov out of the picture, it was at this point that the Russians tipped their hand to BSA in regards to their future intentions. It was not coincidental that the number of rifles ordered from BSA was the same as the one and only order placed with Colt for the Berdan I. BSA offered to sell the Russians their Berdan production line, complete with all of it’s equipment, gauges and fixtures, provided they placed a production order for 300,000 rifles with BSA. Under the terms of this offer, the production equipment would be shipped to Russia and set up by BSA’s engineers, following the completion of a production order for the 300,000 rifles. This interesting offer had caught the attention of the Russians. The Armaments Commission sent a team of inspectors to England under the leadership of Captain de Bildering.
The Russian inspection team, while surveying the BSA production facilities, made note of the fact that all of the production machinery at BSA had been designed and built by Greenwood & Batley Co., also of Birmingham. During the negotiations with BSA and Hiram Berdan, the Russians conducted a parallel, but separate set of talks with Greenwood & Batley Co. G&B specialized in the production and set up of specialized machinery. The Russians had decided that after the completion of the initial 30,000 rifle order from BSA, that all production of the Berdan II rifle would be shifted to Russia. To accomplish this, the Russians needed to duplicate the production line at BSA. All of the machines, tooling and dies used at BSA, had been produced and set up by Greenwood & Batley. Why commit to buying 300,000 rifles from BSA in order to acquire what would by then, be heavily used and worn equipment? While these parallel negotiations were under way, BSA discovered that the Russians had hired a team of local draftsmen to make copies of the BSA technical drawings and gauges. If there had been any question of the eventual intent of the Russians before, it was crystal clear after contracts were signed with both BSA and Greenwood & Batley Co. The British arms industry was too small for the parallel negotiations to remain a secret.
By the terms of the agreement with Greenwood & Batley Co., G&B would duplicate the BSA production equipment and install the entire production line at the Tula arsenal. As part of the terms of the contract, G&B would set up all of the equipment and train Russian personnel how to run it efficiently. Berdan was also requested to consult during this phase. BSA discovered this duplicity and chose to ignore it for much the same reason as Colt had. They assumed that the Russians would require additional production rifles before the equipment could be built and the new production line at Tula brought on line and up to speed producing quality rifles. Besides, BSA had already spent over 20,000 Pounds Sterling in preparation to produce the Berdan II rifle. In defense of BSA’s blindness in the matter, the Russians did an excellent job of dangling the carrot, just as they had with Colt. Follow up orders were frequently discussed and BSA was asked to quote a price for an additional production run of 130,000 Berdan II Cossack rifles. Once again, the vision of producing millions of rifles to rearm the massive Russian Army blinded a company to the reality of what was really happening on the floor of the arsenals and in the back room meetings, which characterized Russian arms procurement during this period. BSA was sucked in by the lure of huge numbers just as Colt had been. Certainly the Russians would place follow up orders when the first 30,000 rifles were complete? Wouldn’t they? Rather than learning from Colt’s experience, BSA committed all of the same mistakes.
Upon learning of the acceptance of the Berdan II and at the urging of Colonel Gorlov, Colt countered by offering to help the Russians set up production of the Berdan I rifle in Russia, if the Armaments Commission, would place an additional order for another 30,000 Berdan I rifles. But the Russians had made up their minds and this was not going to happen. This last gasp was to bring to an end Colt’s involvement with the Russian Government. It was during this same time frame that Russia adopted the Smith & Wesson revolver over the Colt. The last contact between the Russians and Colt came on June 29th, 1871. William B. Franklin, the Vice President and General Manager of the Colt Factory in Hartford, Connecticut, received a request for quotation, issued by the Russians through Hiram Berdan. Colt was asked to provide a price quote as well as a delivery schedule for the possible production of 300,000 Berdan II Infantry rifles. If Franklin bothered to respond at all, his correspondence has not survived. More than likely, the request for quotation was summarily thrown in the trash in a fit of anger. At this point Colt passes from the scene, wiser for the experience with a greatly reduced bank balance.
The development of the Berdan II was very quickly completed. Not because Berdan and the designers working on the Berdan II rifle in Birmingham were any smarter than the original team of Gorlov, Gunius, Berdan and Fraklin who had perfected the Berdan I at the Colt Factory. Rather, it was because the original team at Colt had done such an excellent job in developing the Berdan I. With the exception of the breech locking mechanism, nearly every aspect of the Berdan II was borrowed from the Berdan I. Several different trials were conducted throughout 1870. The Russian Armaments Commission ordered the development of special versions of the Berdan II to arm Cossack, Dragoon and Cavalry regiments. These prototypes were built in the Russian Instruction Battalion workshop. Further refinements of the Berdan II were made both by the Russians as well as the engineers at BSA before the final pattern was sealed on February 1, 1871.
