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Sic transit gloria mundi. One less completely useless thing for Mauserboy to bitch about.
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Posse_Comitatus_Act
"2006: On the Eve of the Midterm Elections, PCA Nullified
Recently, Congress passed a controversial bill which grants the President the right to commandeer Federal or even state National Guard Troops and use them inside the United States. This bill, entitled the John Warner Defense Appropriation Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (H.R. 5122.ENR), contains a provision, (Section 1076) which allows the President to:
“...employ the armed forces, including the National Guard in Federal service, to...
restore public order and enforce the laws of the United States when, as a result of a natural disaster, epidemic, or other serious public health emergency, terrorist attack or incident, or other condition in any State or possession of the United States..., where the President determines that,...domestic violence has occurred to such an extent that the constituted authorities of the State or possession are incapable of maintaining public order;
suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy...” [3]
Senator Patrick Leahy and others have condemned Section 1076 because it effectively nullifies the Posse Comitatus Act and the Insurrection Act (10 U.S.C. 331-335) and gives the President the legal ability to define under what conditions martial law may be declared. [4]
H.R.5122 was signed into law by President Bush on October 17, 2006, and will take effect October 1, 2007 (unless an earlier effective date is established by regulation). "On the same day, Bush signed the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which abolishes the legal protection of habeas corpus, authorizes the president to detain and jail anyone (even US citizens) without charge and subject them to harsh interrogation that may or may not involve torture." [5]
Note: H.R.5122 was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on April 6, 2006, as H.R.5122 by Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-CA). On May 5, 2006, Rep. Tom Cole (R-OK) introduced another version of the bill, H.Res.806, followed by H.Res.811 on May 11, 2006, and H.Res.1062 on September 29, 2006. In the U.S. Senate, Sen. John Warner introduced S.2507 on April 4, 2006, followed by S.2766 on May 9, 2006, and S.2766 on May 9, 2006. Section 1076 appears only in the final signed version (see Stealth legislation) of the bill (Public Law No: 109-364, October 17, 2006): Title X--General Provisions, Sec. 1076, Use of Armed Forces in major public emergencies. The Congressional Record (Page H8151 and Page H8152 shows Section 1076 as amended September 29, 2006, in the U.S. House of Representatives as a change to Section 333 of title 10, United States Code."
This effective repeal of the Posse Comitatus Act followed the recommendations of numerous legal authorities due to the complete lack of effectiveness of the Act and the institutional relutance of the affected agencies to undertake, except in dire situations, those actions which were supposedly prohibited by the act.
One good example is available for download at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=249
A synopsis is at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=249
From The Posse Comitatus Act: A Harmless Relic from the Post-Construction Era or a Legal Impediment to Transformation?
Authored by Lieutenant Colonel Donald J. Currier. September 01, 2003
Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy, Strategic Studies Institute
United States Army War College
CONCLUSION AND RECOMENDATION
At the time Congress enacted the PCA, it
served two purposes. First, it was an expression of
Congress’ distaste for using the military in a civil
law enforcement role. Second, it ended the practice
of U.S. Marshals using the military to assist them
in apprehending fugitives. The balance of political
power had changed in Congress, and the new
majority wanted to seize upon the opportunity to
prevent the involvement of the Army in southern
political matters forevermore.regardless of any
potential adverse collateral consequences. More
important than what the PCA did accomplish is
what it did not do. It did not prevent subsequent
presidents from using the military in exactly
the same manner as President Grant did during
Reconstruction. It has not stopped subsequent
presidents from using the military for domestic
purposes when the need was compelling. At its
inception, PCA was the wrong tool for the wrong
job. An angry Congress used a criminal statute of
the type found in Title 18 of the U.S. Code instead
of an organic statute of the type found in Title 10
of the U.S. Code. Congress attempted to clarify
its intent more than 100 years later by enacting
more specific military assistance statutes. They
codified the new statutes more appropriately in
Title 10 of the U.S. Code, sections 371-378. They
should have concurrently repealed the existing
PCA. Over the past 124 years, the Act has slowly
been evolving into a mischievous relic from the
post-Reconstruction era. The PCA today stands
as a dangerous legal impediment to the agility
and adaptability of our national defense.
The Secretary of Defense should immediately
seek repeal of the PCA. Because the Act has
become a symbol of civilian supremacy over
the military, this will be a formidable, but
not impossible, political task. The potential
operational and political consequences of
ignoring the PCA are worse. If, as some have
suggested, we are prepared simply to disregard
the PCA in the future, we are inviting political
harm for our leaders and potential personal civil
and criminal liability for our soldiers. Worse yet,
the Act will continue its chilling effect upon those
who would act boldly, at the very moment when
our national survival may depend on boldness.
The lack of successful prosecutions under
the Act indicates its uselessness as a criminal
statute. Just as the Navy and Marine Corps have
been successfully prevented from inappropriate
participation in civil law enforcement by DoD
directives, so too can the Army and Air Force be
adequately restrained. The more specific existing
DoD policy directives, coupled with the current
provisions of Title 10 of the U.S. Code evincing
congressional intent, are much better suited
than the PCA to implement the policy goals of
minimizing military involvement in civil law
enforcement.
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Posse_Comitatus_Act
"2006: On the Eve of the Midterm Elections, PCA Nullified
Recently, Congress passed a controversial bill which grants the President the right to commandeer Federal or even state National Guard Troops and use them inside the United States. This bill, entitled the John Warner Defense Appropriation Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (H.R. 5122.ENR), contains a provision, (Section 1076) which allows the President to:
“...employ the armed forces, including the National Guard in Federal service, to...
restore public order and enforce the laws of the United States when, as a result of a natural disaster, epidemic, or other serious public health emergency, terrorist attack or incident, or other condition in any State or possession of the United States..., where the President determines that,...domestic violence has occurred to such an extent that the constituted authorities of the State or possession are incapable of maintaining public order;
suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy...” [3]
Senator Patrick Leahy and others have condemned Section 1076 because it effectively nullifies the Posse Comitatus Act and the Insurrection Act (10 U.S.C. 331-335) and gives the President the legal ability to define under what conditions martial law may be declared. [4]
H.R.5122 was signed into law by President Bush on October 17, 2006, and will take effect October 1, 2007 (unless an earlier effective date is established by regulation). "On the same day, Bush signed the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which abolishes the legal protection of habeas corpus, authorizes the president to detain and jail anyone (even US citizens) without charge and subject them to harsh interrogation that may or may not involve torture." [5]
Note: H.R.5122 was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on April 6, 2006, as H.R.5122 by Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-CA). On May 5, 2006, Rep. Tom Cole (R-OK) introduced another version of the bill, H.Res.806, followed by H.Res.811 on May 11, 2006, and H.Res.1062 on September 29, 2006. In the U.S. Senate, Sen. John Warner introduced S.2507 on April 4, 2006, followed by S.2766 on May 9, 2006, and S.2766 on May 9, 2006. Section 1076 appears only in the final signed version (see Stealth legislation) of the bill (Public Law No: 109-364, October 17, 2006): Title X--General Provisions, Sec. 1076, Use of Armed Forces in major public emergencies. The Congressional Record (Page H8151 and Page H8152 shows Section 1076 as amended September 29, 2006, in the U.S. House of Representatives as a change to Section 333 of title 10, United States Code."
This effective repeal of the Posse Comitatus Act followed the recommendations of numerous legal authorities due to the complete lack of effectiveness of the Act and the institutional relutance of the affected agencies to undertake, except in dire situations, those actions which were supposedly prohibited by the act.
One good example is available for download at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=249
A synopsis is at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=249
From The Posse Comitatus Act: A Harmless Relic from the Post-Construction Era or a Legal Impediment to Transformation?
Authored by Lieutenant Colonel Donald J. Currier. September 01, 2003
Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy, Strategic Studies Institute
United States Army War College
CONCLUSION AND RECOMENDATION
At the time Congress enacted the PCA, it
served two purposes. First, it was an expression of
Congress’ distaste for using the military in a civil
law enforcement role. Second, it ended the practice
of U.S. Marshals using the military to assist them
in apprehending fugitives. The balance of political
power had changed in Congress, and the new
majority wanted to seize upon the opportunity to
prevent the involvement of the Army in southern
political matters forevermore.regardless of any
potential adverse collateral consequences. More
important than what the PCA did accomplish is
what it did not do. It did not prevent subsequent
presidents from using the military in exactly
the same manner as President Grant did during
Reconstruction. It has not stopped subsequent
presidents from using the military for domestic
purposes when the need was compelling. At its
inception, PCA was the wrong tool for the wrong
job. An angry Congress used a criminal statute of
the type found in Title 18 of the U.S. Code instead
of an organic statute of the type found in Title 10
of the U.S. Code. Congress attempted to clarify
its intent more than 100 years later by enacting
more specific military assistance statutes. They
codified the new statutes more appropriately in
Title 10 of the U.S. Code, sections 371-378. They
should have concurrently repealed the existing
PCA. Over the past 124 years, the Act has slowly
been evolving into a mischievous relic from the
post-Reconstruction era. The PCA today stands
as a dangerous legal impediment to the agility
and adaptability of our national defense.
The Secretary of Defense should immediately
seek repeal of the PCA. Because the Act has
become a symbol of civilian supremacy over
the military, this will be a formidable, but
not impossible, political task. The potential
operational and political consequences of
ignoring the PCA are worse. If, as some have
suggested, we are prepared simply to disregard
the PCA in the future, we are inviting political
harm for our leaders and potential personal civil
and criminal liability for our soldiers. Worse yet,
the Act will continue its chilling effect upon those
who would act boldly, at the very moment when
our national survival may depend on boldness.
The lack of successful prosecutions under
the Act indicates its uselessness as a criminal
statute. Just as the Navy and Marine Corps have
been successfully prevented from inappropriate
participation in civil law enforcement by DoD
directives, so too can the Army and Air Force be
adequately restrained. The more specific existing
DoD policy directives, coupled with the current
provisions of Title 10 of the U.S. Code evincing
congressional intent, are much better suited
than the PCA to implement the policy goals of
minimizing military involvement in civil law
enforcement.
